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IMPLEMENTING THE UNTHINKABLE 
THE FIRST COMMUNITY CHARGES 
Michael Enston 
"During the last election we made it plain, in the clearest print 
possible that we did not propose to abolish the rating 
system ......... extremely strong objections were raised to all the 
alternatives to rating. It would be rather foolish to embark on a 
system that would be highly unpopular".(!) 
Introduction 
The Government's proposals for reform of local government finance, 
published in the Green Paper Paying for Local Government<2> in January 
1986, were received initially by local government finance specialists and the 
opposition political parties with an element of disbelief. To an extent this 
view was based on the fact that a poll tax had been specifically rejected by 
the Government not three years earlier on the basis that it would be hard to 
enforce, would require a complicated and expensive register and, in the 
absence of a rebate scheme, would bear harshly on people with low 
incomes.(3) It was also founded on a view that such a system could not be 
effectively administered and would imply politically unacceptable tax 
levels. 
But the poll tax as a 'final solution' to what was defined as a 
fundamental problem with the character of local spending (the absence of 
perceptibility for the voting citizen and the non-voting vulnerability of the 
commercial ratepayer) found much to commend it. Scotland's role in the 
proceedings was to force a policy decision following protests over rate 
increases which followed, but were not entirely the result of, revaluation in 
1985. Taking the decision to implement the Community Charge in Scotland 
one year ahead of England and Wales served also to alay Conservative fears 
over its unpredictable impact, postponing full Cabinet debate on the 
wisdom of the reform until the time came to draft the English and Welsh 
legislation; by which time legislation for one part of the country was already 
in place. <4> In terms both of its content and timing the reform represented a 
political solution whose implementation would take place without the 
benefit of consent or of any experience or prior research. 
The remainder of this article sets out to assess the introduction of the 
Community Charge in Scotland. The focus is on two aspects of its 
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implementation. The practical issues of implementing a poll tax claimed by 
many to be inherently unworkable and the implications of the level of 
charge set by authorities. 
Implementing the Unworkable? 
The decision to proceed so swiftly with implementation in Scotland 
meant that little time was available for detailed consideration and 
elaboration of the mechanics of establishing the necessary administrative 
framework through which to levy a per capita tax. The Abolition of 
Domestic Rates, Etc (Scotland) Act 19815> is not a detailed piece of 
legislation; a great deal had to be left to be worked out in regulations 
covering elements as basic as the definition of key terms used in the 
legislation, procedures governing registration, collection, exemptions and 
students, application of the Standard and Collective Community Charges 
and the rebate system in its entirety. Authorities were thus faced with 
having to fulfil an already daunting organisational task in a largely 
uncharted legal environment. To compound their difficulties, the 
regulations themselves failed to meet the necessary timescales and were 
often the subject of revision. Additionally, implementation of this 
unproven and intrinsically inefficient tax system would proceed in the face 
of widespread public antipathy and political opposition aimed at directly 
undermining its introduction. 
The process of regulations began with a commencement order made in 
August 1987 which gave effect to the various parts of the Act. With the 
exception of regulations concerning rebates, the Scottish Office had 
originally intended to have all of the regulations prepared for consultation 
before the end of 1987. This timetable was not kept, with the majority of 
regulations being made through 1988. Some, including regulations on 
categories of exemptions and procedures governing the treatment of 
students were not made until January 1989, close to the date by which bills 
would be issued. Regulations covering a subject as fundamental as rebates 
came into force as late as November 1988. A number of sets of regulations 
had subsequently to be revoked and changes made to the primary 
legislation. The Local Government Finance Act 1988<6> which introduced 
the Community Charge system in England and Wales, carried almost one 
hundred amendments to the Scottish legislation necessitating a further 
twenty-one sets of regulations/directions, certain of which were finalised as 
late as March 1989. The 1989 Local Government and Housing Bill had also 
to be used to tidy up earlier drafting errors and add new amendments such 
as the conversion of Women's refuges from collective community charge 
liability back to ratingand the inclusion in categories of exemption of young 
adults under the ~e of 20 who remain at school or in full time non-
advanced courses.< Some changes arose from poor drafting in a situation 
of uncertainty or the identification of new problems; others, such as the 
position of women's refuges, were the result of political pressure which 
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itself engendered uncertainty even where the original rules were ultimately 
left unaltered. 
One important drafting error concerned the regulations covering 
poeple living in premises subject to business rates but which are partly 
residential such as some public houses, guest houses, and hotels. An 
amendment in the 1988 Act omitted to specify that people who were 'solely 
or mainly resident in part residential subjects' would still be liable for 
Community Charge. COSLA estimated that this would have 
unintentionally exempted some 50,000 adults with a resultant revenue loss 
of £15 million. Regulations were swiftly drafted to deal with the unintended 
loophole although further primary legislation was required in the 1989 
Local Government and Housing Bill. 
The 1989 Bill was in fact used quite extensively to add changes to the 
system. Some changes were fairly dramatic, such as the inclusion of 
enabling powers to set up a scheme of transitional relief for certain 
categories of community charge payer including some former ratepayers 
and their partners, pensioners and the disabled. Additionally the 1989 Bill 
carried amendments to the rules governing the application of the Standard 
Community Charge and extension to the definition for exemption purposes 
of 'severely mentally handicapped' to include "those suffering from 
degenerative brain disorders. Regulations governing the treatment of 
second homes (the Standard Community Charge) and the treatment of the 
severely mentally handicapped had been the subject of persistent criticism 
and pressure for change. Rules governing the treatment of empty farm 
cottages were amended, as late as February 1989, with more fundamental 
changes eventually announced in July 1989 with application form 1990/91. 
The extension to the definition of 'severely mentally handicapped' was 
announced as late as October 1989 at the same time as the Government 
announced changes to safety net arrangements for councils and the 
introduction of transitional relief. Each reform had been previously 
rejected by the Scottish Office but were now to be incorporated following 
pressure on the Department of the Environment. 
In such a climate it was therefore unsurprising that most local 
authorities were not fully prepared. Bills in many instances had to be sent 
out gross of rebate entitlement, payment books were often delayed, 
reminders for those in default on instalments were delayed in some cases, 
while elaborate computer programmes developed for the new system 
performed less than adequately for some authorities. Community Charges 
Registration Officers (CCROs) had difficulty in offering clear advice as 
regulations changed or in taking a consistent approach to the definition of 
exemption. Further, the sheer volume of enquiries from a largely confused 
public placed additional stress on authorities particularly in rebate sections 
while employee costs increased beyond estimates as authorities faced large 
overtime bills, or in some cases the need to recruit and train yet more staff. 
Ill 
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Dealing with an ever present backlog of rebate applications was an 
enduring problem for authorities through the first half of 1989, forcing 
many to delay by some months follow-up procedures for those in default on 
payment. The failure to deal promptly with rebate applications provoked 
confusion and often individual distress. Citizens Advice Scotland reported 
having to deal with 16,000 enquiries in the first three months of Community 
Charge representing 14% of total workload. The entire process carried an 
air of experimentation as amendments were tabled, regulations revoked 
and new provisions introduced. Confusion and at times chaos may have 
reigned throughout the initial process but at no stage did it seem likely that 
a basic system would not be set in place, despite public opposition and 
political campaigns against registration and collection. 
The political campaigns initially promised much but subsequently 
failed to be a potent force against implementation. Public hostility towards 
the new system was widespread. In one poll by MORI, commissioned by 
the Scotsman and published in September 1988, 70% expressed 
disapproval of the new tax. While only 37% supported a campaign of non-
payment against it a sizeable 24% did indicate that they were fairly or very 
likely or certain to refuse to pay. (S) As a campaign tactic non-payment was 
however to split the forces of opposition and nowhere was this more true 
than within the Labour Party in Scotland. Labour's initial response was to 
establish the 'Stop It' campaign which encouraged people to frustrate the 
registration process without incurring personal penalties for non-
registration. They claimed it had been a success but it did not in fact prove 
to be much more than an annoying irritant to Registration Officers. The 
encouragement it gave for people to return uncompleted forms with 
standard questions invited CCRO's to prepare and send standard replies 
which could be dispatched easily. Indeed there may be some truth in the 
claim made by some Registration Officers that the campaign against 
registration perversely assisted the process of registration according it a 
high profile and drawing attention to the punitive fines resulting from a 
failure to cooperate.(9l Nonetheless, Tayside's Registration Officer said 
that some 10% to 15% of the forms issued had been returned with questions 
designed to disrupt the registration process which had resulted in a great 
deal of additional roressure and frustration on staff as well as a 'significant 
increase in costs'. ( 0) 
The local 'Stop It' groups also found themselves divided over the issue 
of non-payment as activists sought to place the question at the top of the 
Labour Party in Scotland's agenda. In March 1988 the Party's Scottish 
Conference failed to resolve the tactical issue and deferred a final decision 
to a recall conference in September. That conference finally decided by a 
majority of two to one against leading a campaign of civil disobedience. The 
Scottish and national leadership had never supported the idea claiming that 
such a tactic would be irresponsible for a party serious about gaining 
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campaign might discredit the party if it could subsequently offer little to 
those facing summary action for default when it came to the crunch. The 
vote did not stop a number of Labour MPs launching a 'Committee of one 
hundred leading Scots' who would refuse to pay. On the same week as 
Labour rejected a campaign of civil disobedience the Scottish National 
Party conference gave near unanimous support to its policy of leading a 
mass campaign of non-payment with the initial aim of signing up 
100,000non-payers. By the time the first payments fell due that target had 
not been met, although the SNP policy did allow the Party to claim the 
mantle of being the only political force which could stop the poll tax. 
Figures issued by Regional Councils for the first register suggested a 
percentage registration rate in the high nineties. However, such figureshad 
to be treated cautiously since no authority could firmly establish the exact 
number of tax subjects residing in an area. Council estimates were often 
based on the electoral roll, perhaps supplemented by other existing sources 
of data. But Glasgow University's Applied Population Research Unit 
found that between October 1987 and October 1988 the total voting public 
in Scotland's four cities had fallen by 26,054 (2.1% ). Taking demographic 
factors such as falling birth rate and migration into account, the Unit 
estimated that two thirds of the fall was due to the young,in particular, 
deliberately omitting to place their names on the roll. In the most deprived 
areas such as the Craigmillar estate in Edinburgh the fall was as high as 
15%.<11l Research commissioned by COSLA and the Scottish Consumer 
Council and published in February 1987 demonstrated the potential 
difficulties with registration, since a main effect of the Community Charge 
is to bring young people into the tax base. Amongst a representative sample 
of 18-24 year olds, there was found to be a high degree of mobility- 34% 
had three or more addresses since the age of 18-and a reluctance to register 
to vote - 32% said they were not registered. <12l The Government 
nonetheless took that precaution in England and Wales of issuing 
authorities with a circular which pointed out that they stood to lose 
Revenue Support Grant if their registration lists were lower than figures 
suggested by the Office of Population and Census Surveys. 
Maintaining the register presented authorities with further problems. 
In just 12 months since the first register was established an estimated one 
million changes had to be incorporated, far exceeding original estimates. In 
Strathclyde over 700,000 changes had been made to a register totalling 1.8 
million people. Only 30% of the entries were expected to change each year; 
in the first year in5trathclyde the actual figure was 40%. In Tayside 6,000 
were reported to be required each week representing a 100% change in 12 
months, partly accounted for by a shifting student population. Even in 
Dumfries and Galloway a figure as high as 35% was reported, much greater 
than expected for a sparsely populated area. Such high figures might have 
been a product of weaknesses with the source data for draft registers but 
they do illustrate the size of the task facing Registration Officers in 
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maintaining the basis of the entire system. 
It is as difficult to draw firm conclusions from collection levels. By 
early summer 1989 most authorities were reporting satisfaction with 
payment levels in the order of 70-80% of expected income. Computer 
problems, the backlog in rebate applications and industrial action over the 
annual pay increase by the National and Local Government Officers 
Association (NALGO) forced authorities in many cases to delay reminder 
notices and recovery procedures until September. By that time an 
estimated one in six of the population had not paid anything toward their 
bill. The actual non-payment figures ranged from 5% in Borders Region 
through 13%-17% in Dumfries and Galloway, Fife, Grampian, Tayside, 
Highland and Lothian Regions to 20% in Strathclyde and Central Regions. 
In Glasgow the figure was as high as 32%. These figures would fall in 
response to reminder notices and as outstanding rebate claims became 
settled. They could not be said to represent non-payment on a large and 
organised scale and certainly no authority reported facing cash-flow 
problems. However, by late October an estimated 500,000 people were 
over 2 months in arrears, a more alarming statistic for collection authorities 
than those covering non-payment. 
Regional authorities had no clear estimate of the likely ultimate level 
of collection but tended to assume figures of between 4% and 8% in setting 
budgets. The problematic issue for authorities is the amount of resources 
that would have to be committed to recovery procedures to achieve 
collection levels in line with budgeted estimates and the previous yield from 
domestic rating. 
Costs in general were greatly in excess of the administrative cost 
associated with domestic rating. There is no surprise in this - the issue is 
whether the increase should be greater pro-rata than the increase in tax 
subjects. COSLA estimated that capital costs, arising chiefly from the need 
for additional accommodation and computer equipment, were in the order 
of £30 million and revenue costs over £45 million to cover approximately 
2,000 extra staff plus day-to-day running charges- £25 million in excess of 
the annual cost of administering the former system. A more instructive 
measure of tax efficiency is the proportion of income which requires to be 
devoted to administration. Although that figure cannot be accurately 
estimated at this stage, Dumfries and Galloway Regional Council 
estimated that their collection expenses would rise from 1.5% of rate 
income to between 4% and 5% of community charge. 
There is a difficulty in making sense of the implementation process at 
such an early stage. It is true that many problems were a product of the 
timescale for implementation in Scotland and the lack of experience in 
dealing with a per capita tax. In many ways however the real test of the 
administrative machine has only just begun. Establishing a register ofthose 
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liable on the basis of a draft drawn from existing records and supplemented 
by a snap shot canvass is one thing; maintaining records of the movements 
of the 3.9 million adult population and ensuring that billing is changed and 
debts followed up is quite another. Moreover it is already clear from the 
available figures that registration in particular will come under increasing 
stress. There is little within the system to inspire confidence that high 
registration levels can be maintained, particularly amongst the young and 
transient groups. Scottish experience here must question the ability to 
compile and maintain accurate registers in large English cities. Registering 
individuals and households who move from one area to another will also 
prove testing particularly as most people show little sign of demonstrating 
an awareness of their responsibilities under the new system. Dealing with 
arrears as opposed to deliberate non-payment will also prove more 
problematic as time goes on, particularly with low income groups, adding 
pressure on budgets in future years. Administrative costs will be likely to 
rise as a proportion of income thereby demonstrating a strong inverse 
relationship between effectiveness and economy of collection. In time this 
will place pressure upon charge levels and lead to added public resentment 
if willing payers perceive that their bills are in part a product of a failure to 
achieve maximum registration and collection levels. Similarly, the extent of 
exemptions now created and the hastily devised ~nd limited scheme for 
transitional relief will create unfairness and anomalies which will do little to 
counter such resentment; and that is an ominous beginning for any new tax 
system. 
The First Charges 
The attempt to establish the legal and administrative framework for an 
untested tax system under such a short timescale was a political risk. Had 
the timescale proved impossible or problems with the nature of the tax 
insurmountable, the entire reform process would have been seriously 
undermined and the credibility of the reform's proponents, including the 
Prime Minister, significantly damaged. But a far greater political and 
electoral risk existed over the question of the likely tax levels that would be 
required, the more so because little prior research had been undertaken 
ipto the impact of a poll tax upon individuals. It is at this level that Scottish 
experience would prove most valuable. 
The unpredictable level of Community Charge that would be required 
to replace domestic rate bills at first caused the Cabinet some indecision 
over abolishing domestic rating, and hesitation about giving any detail of 
the work of the internal inquiry which had been set up to examine rating 
reform after criticism at the 1984 Conservative party conference. The 1986 
Green Paper, like its 1981 predecessor, failed to produce estimates of likely 
poll tax levels alleging only that, in Scotland, with a full Community Charge 
and safety netting 48% of households would gain and 52% lose. Though the 
Green paper did not provide the estimated charge levels upon which such 
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illustrations were based, the press briefing material which accompanied its 
publication on 28 January 1986 gave an average for Scotland of £207. 
Estimated levels were also published for each area with Glasgow the 
highest at £245. The full list is reproduced in Table 1. 
In any event the logic of the new system suggested that authorities 
would not be disposed to levy punitive charge levels. Supposedly, with 
every adult now receiving their own flat rate bill and with the full cost of 
expenditure above inflation falling solely on the domestic sector local 
decision makers become more sensitive to spending decisions. Accordingly 
the system of government spending penalties is no longer required ans less 
emphasis is placed on selective action ('ratetapping') as a deterrent. 
Moreover, the grant system does not now reflect differences in the 
resources of local authorities, giving instead a standard grant distributed on 
the basis of population levels and a needs grant based partly upon a client 
group measurement of an authority's spending need. Resource equity 
between authorities is further assisted by the pooling of non-domestic rate 
income and its redistribution back to authorities on a per capita basis, 
through the deduction of needs grant from authoritie!! with above average 
non-domestic rate income. Hence, a basis is also created for inter authority 
comparisons of tax levels and spending policies. The assumption is that with 
such a system in place the Government need not become as closely involved 
in local authority spending decisions thereby diminishing central-local 
conflict. 
By the time the first charges had been set it became clear that theory 
had not been turned into practice. Not only were charges well in excess of 
Scottish Office estimates -they were also associated with real expenditure 
growth. Table 1 compares actual Community Charges in each area with the 
estimates produced by the Scottish Office. These show an average increase 
above estimates of 16.1% (excluding Island authorities) with actual levels 
in 27 areas over 20% higher than estimated. In only seven areas were the 
charges at or below Scottish Office estimates. At individual authority level 
the differences were often more striking. Fourteen District Councils had 
figures over 30% in excess of estimates with East Kilbride District 90.4% 
above and Aberdeen and Motherwell 70% and 65.4% respectively. 
Spending had also grown in real terms, being 6.5% above planned 
expenditure compared with 3.8% for the previous year - an increase on 
actual budgets for 1988/89, according to the Scottish Office, of £465 million 
or 12%. 
Several factors are relevant in explaining why the new financial 
accountability did not emerge and why the actual figures were often well in 
excess of estimates published less than three months prior to the 
declaration of actual charges. Firstly, in the absence of a base year there 
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TABLE 1: Community Charge Levels (coot' d) 
TABLE 1: Community Charge Levels(£) 
A 8 c D Safety Net 
A 8 c D Safety Net 
Eslimlte Tuget Actual %Dill'. Elfed 
Eslimlte Tuget Actual %Dill. Elred 
Area 1985/116 1989190 19119M 
C-D District Region 
Area 1985/116 19119/98 19119/98 C-D District Region 
Borders region 
Strathclyde region 
1 Berwickshire 156 177 236 33.3% 
-11 -35 
32 Argyll and Bute 208 293 277 -5.5% 6 18 
2 Ettrick & Lauderdale 157 180 247 37.2% 
-10 -35 
33 Bearsden and Milngavie 223 280 298 6.4% -25 18 
3 Roxburgh 161 190 247 30.0% 
0 -35 
34 Clydebank 226 293 297 1.4% 0 18 
4 Tweeddale 153 174 248 42.5% 
-15 -35 
35 Clydesdale 198 293 301 2.7% -9 18 
36 Cumbemauld and Kilsyth 204 293 275 -6.1% -1 18 
Central region 
37 Cumnock & Doon Valley 204 293 276 -5.8% 1 18 
5 Clackmannan 174 225 300 33.3% 
-2 -32 
38 Cunninghame 221 293 278 -5.1% 12 18 
6 Falkirk 182 211 259 22.7% 
-6 -32 
39 Dumbarton 235 293 298 1.7% 5 18 
7 Stirling 204 249 310 24.5% 
-3 -32 
40 East Kilbride 201 293 318 8.5% -12 18 
41 Eastwood 221 264 282 6.8% -20 18 
Dumfries & Galloway region 
42 Glasgow 245 293 306 4.4% 36 18 
8 Annandale and Eskdale 155 197 253.5 28.7% 
2 -26 
43 Hamilton 234 293 291 -0.7% -14 18 
9 Nithsdale 157 192 245.5 27.9% 
-5 -26 
44 Inverclyde 218 283 291 2.8% -18 18 
10 Stewartry 156 196 243.5 24.2% 
1 -26 
45 Kilmarnock & Loudoun 221 293 269 -8.2% 2 18 
11 Wigtown 149 178 246.5 38.5% 
-15 -26 
46 Kyle & Carrick 223 290 308 6.2% -18 18  47 Monklands 215 293 293 0.0% -12 18 
48 Motherwell 217 288 305 5.9% -18 18 
Fife region 
12 Dunfermline 203 249 293 17.7% 
1 -1 
49 Renfrew 237 293 295 0.7% -6 18 
13 Kirkcaldy 216 256 298 16.4% 
-4 -1 
50 Strathkelvin 219 293 299 2.0% -16 18 
14 North-EastFife 211 251 320 27.5% -16 
-1 Tayside region 
Grampian region 
51 Angus 175 238 293 23.1% -1 -12 
15 Aberdeen 174 201 304 51.2% 
2 -35 
52 Dundee 212 274 324 18.2% 9 -12  
16 BanffandBuchan 144 185 275.5 48.9% 
-4 -35 
53 Perth and Kinross 182 237 299 26.2% -10 -12 
17 Gordon 144 183 263 43.7% 
-4 -35 
18 KincardineandDeeside 142 168 251 49.4% -21 
-35 Islands 
19 Moray 141 176 261 48.3% 
-8 -35 
Orkney 93 84 148 76.2% -39 
Shetland 97 202 114.16 -43.5% 0 
Western Isles 103 126 171 35.7% 0 
Highland region 
20 Badenoch and Strathspey 162 186 235 26.3% -13 
-12 
21 Caithness 145 196 225 14.8% 
1 -12 
1. Figures include water charges. 
22 Inverness 157 189 226 19.6% 
-13 -12 
2. Safety net figures have been rounded. 
23 Lochaber 161 202 237 17.3% 
-9 -12 
24 Nairn 167 181 228 26.0% 
-20 -12 
25 Ross and Cromarty 146 190 239 25.8% -20 
-12 
26 Skye and Lochalsh 150 187 225 20.3% -9 
-12 
27 Sutherland 148 168 206 22.6% 
-33 -12 
Lothian region 
28 East Lothian 223 307 374 21.8% 
-12 -2 
29 Edinburgh 229 313 392 25.2% 
-6 -2 
30 Midlothian 228 306 364 19.0% 5 
-2 
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attempts by the Scottish Office to introduce surrogate measures authorities 
took the view that in the first year the public would tend to associate high 
tax levels with the system itself as opposed to local spending policies. 
Secondly, the removal of grant penalties for spending above guideline was 
important in a year in which authorities received a more generous than 
usual grant settlement. Finally, general uncertainty made authorities wish 
to place their budgets on a firm footing and a relatively high base so as not to 
be forced into high increases the following year. 
Absence of Comparability 
In its first year of implementation the Community Charge was unlikely 
to be able to fully deliver the kind of gains claimed for it in terms of 
expenditure restraint and increased electoral realism in local spending 
policies. The public after all, in the absence of a yardstick by which to judge 
how far their bill related to spending policies, would likely, given the 
reform's unpopularity, accord any blame for high bills on the system itself 
and its creators. The only measure would be by comparison with charges in 
other areas or with Scottish Office estimates but these are far less powerful 
comparators than year on year increases. The Government's dilemma was 
over how to encourage low charges in this first year without the previously 
available weapon of grant penalties or indeed of selective action, which 
they had made clear would only be used in very exceptional circumstances, 
if at all. 
The Government attempted to resolve this dilemma by introducing 
measures aimed at encouraging comparability where none existed. The 
chief measure was the publication and promotion of target community 
charge figures. These were published for each area in November 1988 and 
are shown in Table 1. The Scottish Secretary was to tell the House of 
Commons that the estimated charges, which resulted in a Scottish average 
of £267 were based on the estimated level of local authority spending, 
taking into account the level of inflation and a Revenue Support Grant 
increase of almost double the rate of inflation. The Government hoped that 
authorities would, in drawing up budgets, aim their spending plans around 
a target community charge level. This clearly did not happen - for local 
authorities there were many more factors to consider and most rejected the 
assumptions underlying the estimated figures as well as the Government's 
right to publish them. 
The Scottish Office had in fact been publishing annual estimates of 
charges since the Green Paper was introduced. These showed the Scottish 
average rising from £207 in 1985/86 to £221 the following year, £253 in 1987 I 
88 and £267 in 1988/89. Those figures came to be challenged by authorities 
whose own estimates were invariably higher. When in 1987/88 Edinburgh 
District Council and Lothian Regional Council published, quite 
independently of each other, estimates of £420 and £402 respectively, 
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compared to a Scottish Office figure of £255 the riposte from the then 
Minister for Local Government, Michael Ancram, was that under the new 
Community Charge regime no Council would dare propose to raise local 
taxation by the amount suggested. In the event the actual figure for 
Edinburgh was £392. Although the Scottish Office failed to respond to 
numerous calls from local authority leaders to reveal the basis upon which 
the annual estimates were based, the methodology became clear. This was 
to divide domestic rate income (the produce of domestic rateable value and 
rate poundage) by the respective adult population. This methodology was 
seen as critically flawed in that it took no account of exemptions to the 
Community Charge, or the fact that students would pay only 20%, and 
assumed that collection levels and reliefs would be the same as for domestic 
rating. The assumptions used also ignored the effect of grant penalties and 
the limitation to increases in the non domestic rate. The target figures 
published for 1989/90 were based on the figures used for 1988/89. Scottish 
Office officials suggested that given the above inflation increase in Revenue 
Support Grant, additional expenditure to take account of inflation should 
not lead to charges higher than those suggested for 1988/89. Where the 
grant increase was higher than the regional average increase of 9.6% (in 
each case except Strathclyde) a compensatory downward adjustment was 
made.<13l 
In a further attempt to influence local authority budgetary decisions a 
consultation paper on a Code of Practice for the publication of information 
accompanying demand notices was published. It proposed that in future 
each community charge payer should receive a sheet giving the 
Government's assessment of a Council's spending needs, the Council's 
proposed level of expenditure and the difference between the two 
expressed in community charge terms. Also proposed was the inclusion of 
statistics giving the Scottish Office estimates of the average Community 
Charge and Water Charge. With the absence of a base year for electors to 
compare increases, the paper proposed that in year one the information 
sheet include Scottish Office illustrative figures for 1988/89. <14l The 
consultation paper received an angry response from local authority leaders. 
COSLA described the proposals as "yet another example of central control 
being imposed unnecessarily and with a bias against local government". <15l 
In the event the most contentious elements in the paper were dropped and 
agreement reached on the form that information should take without the 
need for the Secretary of State to impose it. 
The announcement in January 1989 that the Scottish Office intended 
to publish a 'league table' of spending increases by Councils can also be 
viewed as an attempt to condition local budget decisions through the 
publication of comparative information. In making this announcement so 
close to the date by which charges would be announced, the Scottish Office 
could not have expected to influence significantly local authority budgets, 
as most of the key expenditure decision had already been taken. It was 
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hoped however that it might have a salutary effect on the latter stages of the 
process leading authorities to seek lower charges, perhaps by employing 
balances, or reducing contingency provision. Significantly, the 
announcement was made on the same day as authorities were issued with a 
circular reminding them of the reserve power under the 1987 Act to take 
selective action to force an authority to reduce its charge. It rather 
ominously pointed out that, 
"The Secretary of State has already made it clear to local authorities that 
under the new community charge regime he is less likely to exercise the 
selective action powers available to him, since the new system will put its 
own pressure on authorities to exercise restraint in their spending 
policies and plan their budgets prudently. Authorities should be aware 
however that the Secretary of State is empowered ...... to reduce the 
personal community charge determined by a local authority if he is 
satisfied that their total estimated expenses for any year are excessive 
and unreasonable. Careful consideration will therefore continue to be 
given to authorities budget proposals".<16) 
Selective action was not in fact taken against any authority during 
1989/90. To have done so would have discredited the new system and made 
a mockery of the new accountability. Nonetheless the circular does indicate 
that the Government may in future be willing to resort to intervention if 
authorities do not behave in accordance with the tenets of the reform. 
If the Government's intention throughout was to provide surrogate 
measures of comparability to encourage low charges it largely failed. 
However, the Government by its own actions discouraged that which it was 
seeking to achieve because inter authority comparisons were clouded by 
the decision to introduce a partial safety net. This was employed in the 
grant distribution formula to limit grant gains in some authorities whilst 
lessening the loss in others. 
The scheme, which was originally to remain in grant distribution for 
three to five years, was used to protect the share of grant going to those 
authorities where the combined regional and district charges would 
otherwise be over £275. Any reduction in grant share would be limited so 
that it did not take the combined charge, excluding water, above £275. The 
safety net was to be funded by restricting gains in grant share by other 
authorities to 38% of what they would have been with no safety net. 
As Table 1 shows, this allowed Strathclyde Region to retain over £31 
million (equivalent to £18 per Community Charge payer) which it would 
otherwise have lost. At district level £23.3 million is withheld in grant from 
most districts primarily to protect Glasgow which retained an amount 
equivalent to £36 per charge payer. Safety netting proved to be 
controversial since it seemed to be aimed solely at engineering artificially 
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low charges in areas within Scotland's most populous region. Although 
other authorities were technically not losing grant- since the overall effect 
is to distribute money away from Strathclyde- they were quick to argue just 
that. 
It proved difficult to avoid the view that safety netting was employed 
by the Government to depress charge levels in Scotland's most populous 
region. In addition the Government might have hoped that Strathclyde 
charges would set the trend elsewhere with low charges in these key areas 
acting as a brake on expenditure elsewhere. Safety netting also had another 
use for the Scottish Office. In its absence many authorities would have 
faced sizeable grant increases. Limiting their potential gains under the new 
arrangements can be viewed as a safeguard against those authorities 
transferring all new found gain into spending increase. The effect, 
nonetheless, was to cloud the issue of inter authority comparisons which 
Ministers hoped the Community Charge would engender. The result made 
authorities less concerned than they might otherwise have been with 
Community Charge levels being discussed elsewhere. Following the change 
announced for England and Wales, the self-financing safety net will be 
abolished from 1991192, with losers then protected for 3 years through 
additional specific grant. 
Removal of Grant Penalty 
Deciding upon the level of aggregate Revenue Support Grant itself 
posed a further dilemma for the Government. Encouraging low charges 
might require a policy of increased grants yet this also ran the risk that, in 
the absence of grant penalties, authorities might simply transfer any grant 
gain into spending increases as opposed to lower charges. Conversely, a low 
increase in grant might place pressure on charges and allow authorities to 
blame a parsimonious grant settlement for resultant high charges. 
On 27 July 1988 the Secretary of State for Scotland announced that 
provision for local authority current expenditure would be £3,930 million-
4.6% above authorities' adjusted budgets for 1988/89 and including £25 
million provision for the costs of administering the Community Charge, in 
line with the figure sought by COSLA. Aggregate exchequer grant was set 
at £2,500 million - a 5.5% increase on the 1988/89 settlement. After 
deduction of specific grants, £2,243.8 million was left for Revenue Support 
Grant- a 9.8% increase over 1988/89 Rate Support Grant. The actual 
increase available to authorities was slightly less than 9.8% if one takes into 
account the cost of implementing the Community Charge and the 
establishment of school boards. In addition, the Revenue Support Grant 
calculation included elements previously paid separately or treated 
differently such as subsidy for housing improvement grant. Nonetheless, 
compared with previous years the grant settlement was considered 
generous. 
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Authorities did not however respond in the manner hoped for. 
Penalties on Government Grant for local authority expenditure above 
guideline had played an important role in the policy of restraining local 
authority spending. Since it had become an important factor in drawing up 
budgets, its abolition allowed authorities to budget over assessed 
expenditure levels without fear of financial penalty. Local authorities 
would now face only the electoral consequences, or the possibility of 
selective action, for 'overspending'. Following years of grant cuts 
authorities chose not to use grant increases to depress Community Charges. 
Budget Uncertainty 
There were a number of elements of uncertainty leading authorities 
either to retain large balances or build into their budgets elements for 
contingency. Inflation (particularly wage inflation) and interest rates were 
on an upward trend. Authorities understandably did not wish to leave 
themselves vulnerable to higher than predicted wage settlements or further 
unanticipated increases in capital charges. The fact that under the new 
system, the budgetary decision making process had to be undertaken six 
weeks earlier (to accommodate payment in twelve as opposed to ten 
instalments) also left authorities with less information than might have 
previously been available. The unpredictable cohection rate added to 
pressure to maintain balances and contingency swns. Authorities had no 
wish to see sudden increases in year two as a result of any ofthese factors at 
a time when the public would have a basis of comparison and in the run up 
to the 1990 Regional Elections. With gearing increased under the new 
system (the process whereby above inflationary costs must be met solely by 
charge payers instead of both domestic and non domestic payers) concern 
on this point was acute since any higher than anticipated cost increases in 
year one would have a ratchet effect on budgets in year two. 
The chief political calculation made by authorities related to the 
perception that the public would associate charge levels with the new 
system itself. With Scottish Office estimates generally considered 
discredited, authorities tended not to be overly concerned with their tax 
l!!vels in comparison. Nor did the likely levels being reported in other areas 
have a great effect, partly because of safety netting, but also because 
authorities recognised that their counterparts often started under more or 
less favourable budgetary circumstances. Full information about other 
councils was in any event limited making comparisons difficult. Levels 
elsewhere probably did have some effect leading some authorities to take a 
more or less positive view of Community Charge rates at the margin. 
Authorities were not oblivious to levels elsewhere or to Scottish Office 
estimates. They would not wish to place themselves in a position where they 
were greatly out of line. The circular to authorities in January reminding 
them of the reserve powers of selective action may have also introduced an 
element of caution. Having a charge which compared favourably with 
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elsewhere probably did have some effect leading some authorities to take a 
more or less positive view of Community Charge rates at the margin. 
Authorities were not oblivious to levels elsewhere or to Scottish Office 
estimates. They would not wish to place themselves in a position where they 
were greatly out of line. The circular to authorities in January reminding 
them of the reserve powers of selective action may have also introduced an 
element of caution. Having a charge which compared favourably with 
elsewhere, either in absolute terms or in terms of excess over estimates, 
may have been important when it came to definding budgets publicly. 
Some authorities were able to lower charges at the last moment in 
response to changes in the way pension fund surpluses were dealt with. As 
surpluses on superannuation funds had reached a level which made them 
possibly liable to income tax, the Scottish Secretary announced that 
increases in pension fund costs should be charged to the superannuation 
fund rather than to community charge payers. For some the announcement 
came too late. Others managed to lower community charges (eg. in 
Highland by £5, and in Borders by £6). 
As 1989 progressed central-local relations did improve with the 
perception that local government was approaching the end of what had 
been a long and often frantic legislative period. Presenting the 
Government's legislative response to the Widdicombe Committee of 
Enquiry<
17
l, the Secretary of State for the Environment on 2 February 1989 
heralded the Local Government and Housing Bill as the last piece in the 
local government reform jigsaw. Similarly the Conservative party 
manifesto for the English county council elections declared that the ten 
year campaign to transform local government was virtually complete. (IS) 
The Secretary of State for Scotland went further in declaring, at the annual 
conference of the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities in March, that 
while the last decade had been a difficult one for central local relations, 
"There is good reason to believe that the next ten, while not free offriction, 
will see a more practical relationship, a mutual respect and a proper 
recognition of the respective roles of each". (t9) The ending of grant 
penalties was cited as one reason why a 'more co-operative relationship' 
should emerge. It was also suggested by some that Ministers had taken the 
conscious decision that the success of new initiatives would rest on the co-
operation of local councils as well as in some cases their active partnership. 
At the end of a period of contentious legislative enactments such 
statements carried a ring of self-interested magnanimity. On Community 
Charge and local spending levels any such improvement to central-local 
relations will ultimately depend upon the extent to which authorities 
behave in the manner suggested by the reforms. Here, the evidence is that, 
as with rate levels, annual arguments over central government support and 
'blame' for charge levels will continue and probably intensify. 
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Conclusion 
It would be premature to speculate on the future of the Community 
Charge on the basis of first year evidence. A number of special factors tend 
to cloud the picture. It is difficult to separate intrinsic problems with 
administering a poll tax from those resulting from implementation 
problems in Scotland caused by lack of experience and technical expertise. 
Similarly, that the new financial accountability did not emerge may have 
much to do with absence of a base year to compare the charge levels with. 
Moreover, the shape of the new financial regime is not entirely clear. 
Amendments continue to be made, and the impact of the move toward a 
national uniform business rate is unclear as is the continuing effect of safety 
netting arrangements. 
The criticisms made of the 1987 Act have certainly not been refuted by 
experience to date; the practical problems of administering a per head tax 
have not been overcome and in some areas may yet prove insuperable, 
while the "gearing" mechanism will begin to affect council finances in a 
serious way. Immediate reductions in service and employment levels seem 
unlikely if authorities continue to judge that blame for charge levels will fall 
upon the system and its proponents. Moreover many have accumulated 
balances available for use. The most immediate test of whether the 
experiment can pay off comes in the 1990 Regional Elections. The 
Conservative campaign began last summer and has to date concentrated 
solely on promising substantially lower bills if Conservative candidates are 
returned. The succession of criticisms made by the new Party Chairman, 
Michael Forsyth MP, on so called 'junketting' and 'overspending' by 
Labour central authorities together with the establishment within the Party 
of a 'monitoring unit' to expose 'overspending' seems to have set the 
campaign tone. The simplistic theme with its customarily limited view of 
local democracy and the local elector is in keeping with the tenets of the 
reform but seems unlikely to generate the desired result in the short term. 
Should authorities fail to reduce expenditure, selective action cannot be 
ruled out. The Government has already demonstrated a willingness to 
undermine its faith in the new system where its electoral viability is 
perceived to be threatened. Since that threat is in a purely English context it 
is on the basis of experience there that has come the impetus for recent 
changes such as transitional relief, additional exemptions and reforms of 
the safety net provisions. Scotland may have proved a useful test-bed for an 
unpredictable reform and assisted in ensuring that reform happened at all, 
but it will be on the basis of experience elsewhere that will prove to have a 
more enduring effect on its future local government finance system. 
Michael Enston is Head of the Councillors' Research Unit with Edinburgh 
District Council. 
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